The Position That There Is No Reshus Harabim Today

The statement that "there is no reshus harabim today" is often repeated as though it were a self-contained halachic rule. In the Shulchan Aruch and in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, it has a more precise meaning. It is the practical consequence of a particular opinion about the definition of reshus harabim, together with the factual conditions that prevailed in the places where that minhag developed.

The dispute concerns shishim ribo. One group of Rishonim and Poskim holds that a Torah-level reshus harabim can exist only where the public use corresponds to six hundred thousand, like the encampment in the Midbar. Other major Rishonim reject that additional requirement. The Alter Rebbe records both sides.

The Alter Rebbe's actual formulation

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:11 first defines a reshus harabim by its physical form: public roads and marketplaces of the required width, not roofed, with the relevant rules of walls, gates and public passage. He then writes:

וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁכֹּל שֶׁאֵין שִׁשִּׁים רִבּוֹא עוֹבְרִים בּוֹ בְּכָל יוֹם כְּדִגְלֵי מִדְבָּר, אֵינוֹ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אֶלָּא כַּרְמְלִית.

He then continues:

וְעַל פִּי דִבְרֵיהֶם נִתְפַּשֵּׁט הַמִּנְהָג בִּמְדִינוֹת אֵלּוּ לְהָקֵל וְלוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין לָנוּ עַכְשָׁו רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גְּמוּרָה.

The sequence is explicit. "There are those who say" that six hundred thousand are required. On the basis of their words, the minhag spread in "these countries" to be lenient and say that there was no full reshus harabim at that time.

The Alter Rebbe does not say that the Torah category of reshus harabim had ceased to exist. He describes a minhag that relied on one side of a halachic dispute because the places being discussed were understood not to satisfy that side's shishim ribo requirement.

A minhag based on an opinion

Other places in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch make the same structure even clearer.

In 252:18 he writes:

בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה שֶׁפָּשַׁט הַמִּנְהָג כְּהָאוֹמְרִין שֶׁעַכְשָׁו אֵין לָנוּ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גְּמוּרָה אֶלָּא כַּרְמְלִית

The minhag is כהאומרים, according to those who say, that there is no full reshus harabim now. The wording distinguishes the accepted practical reliance from a unanimous definition.

In 303:23 the Alter Rebbe is more striking still. He refers to יש אומרים שאין לנו רשות הרבים כלל, those who say that we have no reshus harabim at all, yet in the particular law being discussed he says not to use that opinion as a general reason for leniency. The opinion exists and carries halachic weight, but it does not automatically displace every concern based on the stricter view.

And in 345:11 itself, after saying that those following the lenient minhag should not be protested because they have authorities to rely upon, the Alter Rebbe adds:

וְכָל יְרֵא שָׁמַיִם יַחְמִיר לְעַצְמוֹ

A yerei shamayim should be stringent for himself.

That closing line would be difficult to explain if the preceding statement meant that a Torah-level reshus harabim was halachically impossible in the present era. It makes straightforward sense if the Alter Rebbe is preserving a real dispute while recognizing a widespread minhag based on the lenient side.

Why the earlier sources matter

The expression did not originate as a new rule that history had permanently abolished reshus harabim. It grew out of an older disagreement over whether six hundred thousand are part of the definition.

Rashi and a substantial group of Rishonim connect reshus harabim to the shishim ribo of the Midbar. Ramban, Rivash and other Rishonim object that the Gemara itself gives physical characteristics of reshus harabim without stating a requirement of six hundred thousand. The Shulchan Aruch records the six-hundred-thousand requirement as ויש אומרים. The Taz then explains that the common statement "we do not have a reshus harabim now" reflects that yesh omrim and that the stringent opinion remains a legitimate basis for personal stringency.

The earlier sources for the position show why the slogan cannot be read more broadly than the dispute from which it came.

The facts can change

The Rebbe addressed this exact point in the fourth sicha of Yud-Beis Tammuz 5745. In the course of explaining how a halachic application can change when factual circumstances change, the Rebbe referred to the statement that there was no true reshus harabim because no city met the six-hundred-thousand condition. He then described a later city in which the number was actually established.

The Rebbe rejected the idea that the older factual statement could override the present reality. In the published free translation: "the reality can't be denied." If the required facts are present, the older statement that such a place was not found does not make them disappear.

This does not decide every dispute about how shishim ribo is counted, nor does it establish that every large city is automatically a reshus harabim. It establishes the more basic point: "there is no reshus harabim today" is not an eternal exemption from examining the facts.

What must be asked in a modern city

A modern city therefore has to be examined under the actual halachic definitions. The questions include the width and use of its public ways, whether and how they are enclosed, the rules of mefulash, and the disputed requirement of shishim ribo. If one follows the authorities who require six hundred thousand, the further question is how that number is measured.

Those issues belong to the halachic definition of reshus harabim and the pages on shishim ribo. Their application to present-day facts must be made from the present-day facts.

The older minhag remains an important part of the halachic record. It is not, however, a substitute for determining whether the conditions on which that minhag rested still describe the city being considered.