The Alter Rebbe's Rulings on Reshus Harabim

The Alter Rebbe discusses the status of reshus harabim in several places in his Shulchan Aruch. Read together, these passages show a consistent pattern. He records the opinion that requires shishim ribo, recognizes the widespread minhag that relied on it, and at the same time continues to treat the contrary opinion as a serious halachic position.

The Alter Rebbe records the shishim ribo requirement while also preserving the stricter view on which a yerei shamayim should be stringent for himself. His ruling does not say that a Torah-level reshus harabim cannot exist in the present era.

The definition in siman 345

The central passage is Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:11. The Alter Rebbe begins with the physical definition:

אֵיזוֹ הִיא רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים? רְחוֹבוֹת וּשְׁוָקִים הָרְחָבִים ט"ז אַמָּה עַל ט"ז אַמָּה

He continues with the requirements that these public ways not be roofed and not be enclosed in a manner that removes their status. In a walled city he discusses a road running from gate to gate, with the gates aligned and not closed at night. He also lists intercity roads sixteen amos wide and streets connecting public roads.

Only then does he introduce the numerical requirement:

וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁכֹּל שֶׁאֵין שִׁשִּׁים רִבּוֹא עוֹבְרִים בּוֹ בְּכָל יוֹם כְּדִגְלֵי מִדְבָּר, אֵינוֹ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אֶלָּא כַּרְמְלִית.

The Alter Rebbe then identifies the practical minhag as a reliance on those authorities:

וְעַל פִּי דִבְרֵיהֶם נִתְפַּשֵּׁט הַמִּנְהָג בִּמְדִינוֹת אֵלּוּ לְהָקֵל וְלוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין לָנוּ עַכְשָׁו רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גְּמוּרָה

He says not to protest against those who follow this practice because they have whom to rely upon, but adds in parentheses that every yerei shamayim should be stringent for himself.

The architecture of the se'if is therefore unmistakable. The physical definition comes first. The shishim ribo requirement is a yesh omrim. The minhag of saying there was no full reshus harabim in those countries rests "on their words."

"According to those who say"

Siman 252 makes the same point in a different practical law. In 252:18, discussing a decree connected with carrying near the beginning of Shabbos, the Alter Rebbe writes:

לְפִיכָךְ בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה שֶׁפָּשַׁט הַמִּנְהָג כְּהָאוֹמְרִין שֶׁעַכְשָׁו אֵין לָנוּ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גְּמוּרָה אֶלָּא כַּרְמְלִית

The key word is כהאומרים. The widespread practice follows "those who say" that the public areas then under discussion were not full reshus harabim. The Alter Rebbe is not describing a unanimous fact of halacha. He is identifying which position supports the minhag.

The same formulation recurs later in that siman. The language is consistent with 345:11, where the Alter Rebbe first introduces the requirement as ויש אומרים.

A place where the Alter Rebbe does not use the leniency

Siman 303 is especially useful because it shows how the existence of the lenient opinion does not automatically control every related case.

After discussing the concern that a person might carry an item into reshus harabim, the Alter Rebbe writes:

וַאֲפִלּוּ שֶׁיֵּשׁ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁאֵין לָנוּ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים כְּלָל, אֵין לְהָקֵל בַּדָּבָר.

Even though there are those who say that "we have no reshus harabim at all," he says that this is not sufficient reason to be lenient in the matter under discussion. He permits reliance on the more lenient approach only in the circumstances he specifies there.

A few lines later he again refers to the practice of women wearing jewelry and says that one basis for not protesting is לפי שיש אומרים שבזמן הזה אין לנו רשות הרבים כלל אלא כרמלית.

The same position can therefore be relied upon for some practical purposes and not for others. That is exactly what one would expect from a significant but disputed halachic view.

Siman 363 and the amount of public traffic

In 363:42 the Alter Rebbe discusses a sloped entrance that can function as a partition. Heavy public passage creates a Rabbinic issue there. He then says that according to the authorities who require the public traffic of reshus harabim to reach six hundred thousand, the relevant passage of the public would not have that effect unless six hundred thousand pass through the area each day.

This passage is important for the meaning of עוברים בו בכל יום. It gives real support to an area-specific reading of the shishim ribo condition. The Alter Rebbe and the requirement of shishim ribo page explains why other passages and earlier formulations have nevertheless led Poskim to broader city or network readings.

The point here is narrower. The Alter Rebbe continues to formulate the six-hundred-thousand criterion as the view of a particular group of authorities, not as the undisputed definition of reshus harabim.

Siman 392 and the city as a unit

In 392:1 the Alter Rebbe discusses the laws of making an eruv for a city. A city of many people with the relevant public character ordinarily requires that a small area be left outside the common shituf, so that the laws of reshus harabim not be forgotten.

He then writes that according to the authorities who hold that a public area without six hundred thousand passing through it each day is not a full reshus harabim, no such area need be left out unless six hundred thousand pass through the city. He concludes that the current custom relies on this leniency and does not leave out an area in any city.

This passage places the shishim ribo discussion inside a law whose unit is the city itself. It does not by itself settle every question about whether the six hundred thousand must use one street, a public district, or the city's public street system. It does show why the Alter Rebbe's various formulations have to be read together rather than extracting one pronoun from 345:11 as though no other city-level passage existed.

The parenthetical stringency in siman 345

The parenthetical ending of 345:11 deserves its full weight:

וְכָל יְרֵא שָׁמַיִם יַחְמִיר לְעַצְמוֹ

This personal stringency appears immediately after the Alter Rebbe says that the widespread lenient minhag has authorities on whom to rely. The marginal note printed with this passage points to major Rishonim who do not require six hundred thousand, and notes their reason that no such numerical condition is stated in the Gemara.

These passages therefore yield a precise picture. The Alter Rebbe validates the widespread reliance on the shishim ribo opinion and does not permit protesting those who follow it. At the same time, he preserves the contrary view sufficiently to direct a yerei shamayim to be stringent for himself.

The Tzemach Tzedek and the continuing stringent view

Rabbi Levin also cites the Tzemach Tzedek's chiddushim as evidence of the continuing significance of the stricter side. In the passage he quotes, the Tzemach Tzedek discusses public streets in the town of Lubavitch within the framework of the authorities who do not make six hundred thousand an absolute condition. Rabbi Levin draws attention to this precisely because Lubavitch was a small town, yet the stringent definition remained practically relevant to its streets.

That later Lubavitch discussion would make little sense if the Alter Rebbe's phrase about "our present era" had meant that reshus harabim was categorically impossible until some new halachic era began.

What the rulings establish

Taken together, the Alter Rebbe's rulings establish four points.

First, the physical characteristics of reshus harabim remain part of the definition. Second, the requirement of shishim ribo is recorded as a major yesh omrim. Third, the widespread minhag in the Alter Rebbe's setting relied on that opinion and therefore treated ordinary public areas as karmelis. Fourth, the contrary opinion remained sufficiently weighty for the Alter Rebbe to recommend personal stringency and, in some laws, to refuse to use the lenient position as a general dispensation.

The statement "there is no reshus harabim today" is therefore accurate only when it retains the qualifications the Alter Rebbe himself gives it. Detached from those qualifications, it says more than his text says.